Comment: The Houthis and the Red Sea Security Vacuum - Europe Should be Ready to Step Up

 ROME  -- It is understandable that the United States is reluctant to be drawn fully into another conflict in Yemen. But restraint cannot come at the expense of freedom of navigation. The Red Sea must remain open, and if our American friends are unwilling to take the lead, Europeans should be ready to shoulder a greater responsibility.

The rapid Houthi advance has turned turned their ongoing maritime-security violence and disruption into a potentially much greater strategic challenge. The Iranian proxy terror group has expanded its control along Yemen’s Red Sea coastline, while continuing to demonstrate its capacity to threaten commercial shipping, Saudi Arabia and regional energy infrastructure. This is no longer simply just about Yemen.

 The Iranian dimension should underscored. The Islamic Republic’s direct confrontation with the US and Israel has so far failed to deliver the strategic results it sought, while repeated attempts to strike American and allied targets have come at considerable cost. Against this backdrop, the Houthis provide Iran with another means of applying pressure across the region without relying solely on direct Iranian action. Their renewed attacks on Saudi Arabia and Saudi energy infrastructure therefore have significance far beyond Yemen, they place additional pressure on a key US and European partner while extending the reach of the wider confrontation into the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula.

 The Bab el-Mandeb is also one of the vital routes of international commerce linking the Indian Ocean to the Red Sea and Suez Canal. Anything happening there has consequences for countless ports, supply chains, energy markets, and consequently, households and businesses right across Europe. The Houthis are all too aware of this.

 Their attacks on commercial shipping shows how relatively cheap drones and missiles are having a huge impact on international trade. Vessels rerouted around Africa, insurance premiums soaring, delivery times increasing, and European companies paying the price.

 The latest American response should therefore concentrate minds of the EU and wider European neighbourhood.

 US President Donald Trump’s refusal of total American military involvement in strike action at the aid of its Saudi allies underscores the White House’s overly cautious approach to the Houthi dilemma and concern of being swamped by another military engagement. While there lies some important difference between military intervention in civil conflict in Yemen and establishing the solid system of protecting the freedom of navigation for the international community, the latter is not optional for the trading countries which depend on stable sea routes.

 The EU already has a clear response mechanism. EUNAVFOR ASPIDES was created in 2024 to secure commercial shipping and preserve freedom of navigation after the first Houthis’ attacks. The mandate of the organisation was later renewed its mandate into 2027 and expanded to include the greater scope of information exchange and interaction with the Yemeni Coast Guard.

 The problem is not the existence of this important European response mechanism. It is whether its scale matches the threat present.

 Italy has already raised this issue, with Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, who called for more naval deployments to be sent to the Red Sea area and pointed out that Italy and Greece bear too much of the European burden. The Meloni government has even prepared some policy options for its own individual actions if the European efforts are not quick enough.

 For many years, European leaders have called for ‘strategic autonomy’ and taking ownership of its security. Indeed, the Red Sea serves as a great opportunity for Europe to put these much-touted ideas into practice. Europe is not expected to become the strongest military power in the Middle East, nor should it hurry with any military operations in Yemen without clear, specified goals. However, enhancing the maritime presence of European nations is a perfectly justified step.

 An increased presence of European naval forces could reinforce the ASPIDES role. Europe could enhance its intelligence sharing and surveillance cooperation activities with the GCC countries, enhance coordination with Saudi-led maritime initiatives, and strengthen the support of the legitimate government of Yemen. Moreover, Europe could devote more energy and resources to countering arms trafficking activity in the region that the Houthi military infrastructure so depends.

 Such a response should not be developed by Europe in isolation. European and Gulf security interests are increasingly interconnected, particularly when it comes to protecting the Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Closer cooperation with the GCC should therefore be at the heart of any stronger European response, combining European naval capabilities with the considerable regional expertise, resources and strategic reach of the Gulf.

 The Houthi’s most recent terror wave is more than another crisis in the Middle East, but rather a test of whether Europe is capable of protecting its interests when the US is reluctant to fully engage as needed.

 While American reluctance to return to Yemen is understandable. European passivity would be much harder to justify. The Red Sea is an economic lifeline connecting Europe to the Gulf and Asia. Keeping it open is a European interest.

 It may now also have to become a greater European responsibility.

 jp-mr