Lubetkin on Gaza: A foreign minister who hesitates where Uruguay and its Broad Front have very clear positions

   MONTEVIDEO (Uypress/José W. Legaspi) – While UN agencies speak of genocide in Gaza and Netanyahu faces international justice, Uruguay's Foreign Minister, Mario Lubetkin, avoids the term and contradicts his own Broad Front. This caution is difficult to explain in a society accustomed to confronting major debates on human rights without euphemisms.

 Uruguayan society has a long tradition of confronting major debates on human rights and international law without euphemisms. Gaza is once again putting this to the test. While official UN mechanisms speak of genocide and international justice maintains an arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin avoids using that word, even contradicting explicit positions of the Broad Front, the political force that governs Uruguay.

There are times when foreign policy ceases to be a succession of press releases, diplomatic balancing acts, and carefully measured declarations. There are times when it compels one to take a stand.

 Gaza is one of those times.

 Uruguayan society has historically been no stranger to such discussions. Regarding democracy, human rights, state terrorism, self-determination of peoples, and international law, Uruguay has built a political tradition that, despite differences and conflicts, has tended to address fundamental problems and resolve them without considering its geographic size or limited international influence as sufficient reasons to look the other way.

That tradition matters now because there is a word that Foreign Minister Mario Lubetkin continues to avoid when speaking about Gaza: genocide.

This is not a semantic debate. Nor is it about demanding that the Foreign Minister substitute a political declaration for a ruling that belongs to international courts.

It's a much more concrete matter: determining whether Uruguayan foreign policy is prepared to call these events by the name already used by official United Nations mechanisms and, moreover, by the country's own governing political force.

The Word Lubetkin Refuses to Speak

 Lubetkin has repeatedly defended multilateralism, the United Nations, and a rules-based international order. This principle is particularly important for countries like Uruguay: small states depend much more than large powers on the existence of norms capable of limiting the use of force.

 However, when the debate turns to Gaza, a striking caution emerges.

 The Foreign Minister has avoided defining what happened there as genocide and has justified this position by arguing that this term is not used by the United Nations and is not part of the organization's language.

 This argument presents a problem. It is correct to point out that "to date, there is no final ruling from the International Court of Justice establishing that Israel committed genocide in Gaza." Nor would it be accurate to simply state that “the UN declared that genocide occurred,” because the United Nations comprises agencies, political bodies, courts related to its system, and independent mechanisms with different competencies.

 But this does not imply that the word “genocide” is foreign to the language of the United Nations. Quite the contrary.

 “The Gaza Genocide: A Collective Crime”

 Francesca Albanese is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967, one of the special procedures of the Human Rights Council.

 Back in March 2024, she presented a report entitled “Anatomy of a Genocide,” in which she argued that there were reasonable grounds to consider the threshold indicative of the commission of acts of genocide against the Palestinians of Gaza to have been reached.

 The subsequent evolution of her assessment was even more compelling.

 On October 20, 2025, a new report by Albanese, officially identified as A/80/492, was submitted to the United Nations General Assembly by the Secretary-General, pursuant to a resolution of the Human Rights Council.

 Its title leaves little room for interpretation: “Gaza Genocide: A Collective Crime.”

 The report’s summary begins by characterizing what is happening in Gaza as an “ongoing genocide” and analyzes the role of third-party states that, according to the rapporteur, have sustained it through material support, diplomatic protection, or participation. In her introduction, she further states that the Israeli occupation has escalated into a full-blown genocide.

Institutional precision is important: Albanese is an independent expert, and her conclusions “do not constitute a resolution.”

Institutional precision is important: Albanese is an independent expert, and her conclusions “do not constitute a resolution adopted by the General Assembly or a judgment of an international court.”

 But precision must work both ways.

 While it is not appropriate to claim that the United Nations as a whole has legally determined the existence of genocide, it is equally untenable to simply assert that genocide does not belong to the UN's vocabulary.

 It belongs to it to the point of appearing in the title and conclusions of an official document from a Human Rights Council mechanism formally transmitted to the General Assembly.

 Netanyahu already has an international arrest warrant.

 There is another element that makes it even more difficult to reduce Gaza to a diplomatic dispute.

 Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of Israel, has had an arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court since November 21, 2024.

 The ICC found reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant could be held responsible for the war crime of using starvation as a method of warfare and for crimes against humanity, including murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts. It also found reasonable grounds to hold them responsible as civilian superiors for attacks intentionally directed against the civilian population.

 The Court further held that both men deliberately deprived the civilian population of Gaza of goods essential for their survival: food, water, medicine, medical supplies, fuel, and electricity.

 According to the ICC, these restrictions severely affected the water supply and the capacity of hospitals to care for the population. The court even noted that the lack of food, water, electricity, fuel, and certain medical supplies created living conditions capable of causing the death of a portion of the civilian population, with deaths from malnutrition and dehydration, including children.

 It is important to distinguish between legal categories: the ICC's indictment against Netanyahu is not for genocide, but for alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity.

 But it exists.

 And Netanyahu remains listed by the Court itself as an accused and fugitive from its jurisdiction.

 Now Interpol has also entered the picture.

 A new chapter was added to this scenario in August 2026.

 Turkey requested a red notice from Interpol against Netanyahu, in connection with a case related to the Israeli attack on the Global Sumud Flotilla, which was attempting to deliver aid to Gaza.

 The request stems from a Turkish legal process in which Netanyahu and other Israeli officials face charges including genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture. Interpol will have to decide on the Turkish request.

 Here too, it is important to avoid confusion: a Turkish request for an Interpol red notice is not the same as the arrest warrant already issued by the International Criminal Court.

 But both episodes demonstrate the extent to which international responsibility for Gaza has long since moved beyond mere rhetoric. The discussion is now in the courts.

 This is not a formal definition by international organizations, but a clear and concrete practice that has cost the lives of tens of thousands of Palestinians, Lebanese, and Iranians, and acts of terrorism by the Israeli state in several European countries, such as the recent reports of forest fires in Piraeus, Greece, and well-founded suspicions of attacks against trains in Spain.

 And the Broad Front does call it genocide.

 But the most difficult contradiction for Lubetkin to explain is perhaps not in The Hague or the United Nations. It lies within the very political force of the government to which he belongs.

 Because the Broad Front does call what happened in Gaza genocide. And not as an isolated statement by some leader or sector.

 The Broad Front's "Zelmar Michelini" National Plenary, meeting on May 30, 2026, included "the genocide in Gaza" among the events that define the gravity of the international situation.

 The difference is substantial.

 We are no longer, then, facing a debate between those demanding a specific position from the Uruguayan government and a Foreign Ministry that deems it necessary to act with greater prudence.

 We are facing a far more singular situation: the political force governing Uruguay defines as genocide what the Foreign Minister of that same government refuses to define as genocide.

 And this contradiction deserves an explanation.

 Because the Broad Front's foreign policy has a recognizable tradition. It can be debated, like any political tradition, and it has had contradictions and changes. But historically, it has placed at its center the self-determination of peoples, the defense of human rights, and multilateralism.

 Because the Broad Front's foreign policy has a recognizable tradition. It can be debated, like any political tradition, and it has had contradictions and changes. But historically, it has placed the self-determination of peoples, the defense of human rights, multilateralism, international law, and the Palestinian cause at its core.

 Therefore, Lubetkin's position cannot simply be presented as the natural continuation of the Broad Front's international tradition. On this specific point, it contradicts it.

 A society that doesn't need others to decide for it

 Finally, there is a dimension that transcends the Broad Front: Uruguayan society.

 There may be differing opinions on Israel, Palestine, Hamas, October 7th, Netanyahu, the Israeli military response, and a political solution to the conflict. These opinions exist, and it is healthy that they do.

 But Uruguay has historically demonstrated that it can discuss morally and politically difficult issues. It doesn't need them simplified.

 Much less do they need them postponed.

 When an issue involves human rights, international crimes, or essential principles of international law, Uruguay's democratic tradition has been to bring these discussions into the public sphere and resolve them through politics, institutions, and citizen debate.

 Why should Gaza be any different?

 Uruguayan society is perfectly capable of understanding that recognizing the existence of a genocide does not imply hostility toward the Israeli people, much less toward Jews. Similarly, condemning Hamas's crimes does not obligate one to justify the destruction of Gaza.

 It can simultaneously uphold both positions. It can condemn the murder and kidnapping of Israeli civilians and demand the release of the hostages. And it can also examine what happened afterward in Gaza and ask whether a boundary has been crossed—a boundary that international law created precisely to prevent certain horrors from recurring.

 The Coherence of International Law

 There is something even deeper. Uruguay needs a world where the rules apply to everyone.

 A country of just over three million inhabitants lacks the military, economic, or geopolitical capacity to impose its will. Its main international protection lies in the existence of norms, institutions, and courts capable—at least in principle—of limiting the power of the strongest states.

 That is why defending international law when condemning it is cost-free is relatively easy.

 The real test appears when the rules apply to a state allied with a major power.

 The International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Netanyahu. An official mechanism of the United Nations system speaks of an ongoing genocide. The international legal discussion on Gaza is open and documented. And the political force that governs Uruguay has already publicly adopted the word genocide.

 The differences that Uruguayans can recognize at first glance

 Our firm condemnation of Foreign Minister Lubetkin's policies is for very clear and well-founded reasons: the increasingly serious differences with his positions on state terrorism in the Middle East, and his moral conduct and the misuse of public funds during his trips to Rome. All of these latter points will have to be proven, journalistically and even judicially.

 UYPRESS, beginning with the previous column, signed by our agency as such, and this one with my personal signature and therefore with the complete freedom to express my opinion without interference from any agency authority, has been entirely consistent. Something we are proud of.

 What additional prudence, then, does the Uruguayan Foreign Ministry need?

 Words and Politics

It can be argued that a Foreign Minister should use language different from that of a political party. That is true.

 It can also be argued that the definitive legal determination of genocide falls to international justice. That is also true.

 But neither of these two precautions sufficiently explains the assertion that genocide is not part of the United Nations' language when official documents of its mechanisms expressly use the term.

 Nor does it explain why a Foreign Minister belonging to a Broad Front government adopts a more reticent position than the political force that brought that government to power.

Therefore, the discussion no longer revolves solely around a word. It revolves around what foreign policy Uruguay wants to represent.

 One that always waits for the final ruling before taking a position on an international tragedy, or one that, without replacing the courts, is capable of applying their principles when those principles prove inconvenient.

 Uruguay has built much of its international prestige precisely on the latter.

Therefore, the attitude adopted by the National Party deserves our rejection, including its justification of the climate of internal tensions with the government due to the serious accusations related to the Cardama fraud in the purchase of two ocean patrol vessels, for not participating in the meeting convened by the President of the Republic, while the leaders of the other parties (Broad Front, Colorado Party, Open Cabildo, Independent Party) did participate. We are unaware of the resolution adopted by Sovereign Identity.

 This would leave the National Party, for the first time in this period of government, completely isolated.

 Differences upon differences

 It is clear that there are radical differences between the parties. On the one hand, there is the Broad Front and Open Cabildo (we all remember General Hugo Manini's greeting to the Iranian ambassador after the US and Israeli attack), which, as in the case of the Broad Front, never represented support for the religiously fanatical regime of the Tehran government. On the other hand, there are the parties of the opposition as a whole.

This confirms, at an institutional level, that the majority of politicians reject the genocidal attacks by the US and Israel in the region.

 At the level of public opinion, the situation is clearer; all polls show a significant majority rejecting the Israeli government.

 We have spoken out very clearly on this issue. We are deeply affected that the criminal policies of the Tel Aviv government have generated a wave of rejection of Judaism worldwide. It is a significant civilizational setback. This is not a subtlety, nor a semantic game; it is a matter of human and political sensitivity in the face of the radical change that has occurred in the Israeli government.

And the Broad Front also built part of its political identity on this tradition. Perhaps, then, the problem is not that Uruguayan society is not prepared to call things by their name.

 Perhaps it is that its foreign minister is unwilling to do so.